Introduction
Contemporary theories of Virtue Ethics are often presented as theories that are in opposition to Kantian Ethics and Consequentialist Ethics. One reason that is commonly put forward to justify this opposition is that they take different moral questions to be the central or fundamental moral question. Virtue ethics takes character to be at the centre of morality making the fundamental moral question, However, it might be claimed that none of these theories are able to answer both questions. Robert Louden argues for the claim "that we need to begin efforts to coordinate irreducible or strong notions of virtue along with irreducible or strong conceptions of the various act notions into our conceptual scheme of morality" When it is applied specifically to acts, rules, motivations etc., the justification is always that applying it in this way will lead to outcomes being maximised. They are just being proposed as different vehicles that will perform this task. In other words,
Consequentialists could all agree that their doctrine is ultimately that outcomes be as good as possible but disagree on how this central aim is to be achieved. In the light of this, we shall fail to get at the heart of the contrast between these three theories if we, for example, translate them all into an act formulation and then seek to compare and contrast them. Hence, accounts which try to get at the heart of the difference between these three approaches by taking as their starting point Act Utilitarianism will fail to reflect what is central to the Consequentialist approach in both of the above ways by concentrating on an act formulation and happiness as what has intrinsic value.
If it is agreed that this captures the essence of Consequentialism, then it is apparent that understood in this way Consequentialism is not a complete ethical theory. foolhardy, then we can see the inadequacy of using Consequentialsim as a justificatory doctrine for the character that a virtuous agent should have. In both these situations, the two people rush to the edge of a cliff and prevent a small child from falling over the edge. In both cases we can assume that outcomes were as good as possible but that either makes the character of the person performing the action irrelevant or we shall be forced to the conclusion that foolhardiness is also a virtue like courage since outcomes are as good as possible. In other words, since outcomes were as good as possible that justifies the option as being the right option irrespective of the character of the agent.
Alternatively, if outcomes being as good as possible is taken to justify the possession of courage as a virtue this will fail since the same argument could be used to justify the possession of foolhardiness. The fact that outcomes were as good as possible does not, in itself, indicate the presence of courageousness as opposed to foolhardiness.
Although it might be described as courageous to save a small child from falling from the edge of the cliff, this does not guarantee the presence of the virtue of courage as In other words, the justificatory doctrine of Consequentialism specifically encourages decision procedures that are not based on consequentialist calculations.It encourages motivations of direct concern for others, independently of viewing this as a means to maximise expected outcomes. However, this is not to adopt these other motivational doctrines and concerns in their original forms. The acceptance of these is always based on the claim that they will produce the best expected outcome. If they cease to do this, then they will be rejected. They cannot have the same intrinsic worth that is accorded to them from a non-Consequentialist perspective since they are ultimately only valued instrumentally. Although, the best expected outcome might be achieved if we forget that these motivational doctrines only have instrumental value, as has been pointed out by Parfit xviii the justification cannot be entirely forgotten. If
Consequentialism were wholly self-effacing, then we would no longer have a rationale for changing motivational doctrines since the justification would have been entirely concealed.
Hence, the motivations that we have picked to combine with Consequentialism on the ground that they produce the best expected outcome, no longer have the intrinsic worth that is normally accorded to them. The skill necessary to pretend that they do, in order that outcomes be maximised, coupled with the knowledge that they are really only of instrumental value, is the sort of mental gymnastics that Consequentialsim requires.
These two illustrations of the "pick and mix" approach suggested by In both these versions of Virtue Ethics, the character of the virtuous agent is still primary. The virtuous character in choosing makes the action right or the virtuous character is sensitive to features in the situation that make the action right. In both cases, the primary aim will be for the agent to develop a virtuous character. This virtuous character will either in itself make the actions she performs right or will enable her to perceive features in a situation that make an action right.
Kantian Ethics
Like have intrinsic value but rather ground the virtues in the idea of human flourishing, so a virtuous character can be explained in terms of the requirements of the moral law.
Where this suggestion does sound strange is if it is taken as axiomatic that virtue ethics should contain no reference to rules or laws or principles but instead rely on notions of sensitivity that cannot be unpacked in terms of rule following. However, this claim can be attacked on at least two grounds. First, there are exponents of virtue ethics who argue for principles within virtue ethics. For example, Hursthouse claims, "that virtue ethics not only comes up with rules (the v-rules, couched in terms derived from the virtues and vices), but further, does not exclude the more familiar deontologists' rules." xxiv The first sort of rules will be of the sort, 'Act charitably', 'Do not act dishonestly" and the second sort would be, 'Do not tell a lie'. This second sort would be backed up by an appeal to a virtue or vice. In the case of the example given, the reason that you must not tell a lie is because it would be dishonest.
The second ground for attacking this claim is that the opposition between virtue ethics and rules is often based on a view of rules as algorithms for providing an account of what is right. McDowell seems to implicitly make this move when he argues for the non-reduction of the sensitivity of the virtuous person to a list of rules. He writes, "If one attempted to reduce one's conception of what virtue requires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as wrong -and not necessarily because one had changed one's mind; rather, one's mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture in any universal formula." xxv Now it is not necessary to hold this conception of rules and it is at least arguable that Kant did not take rules in this way. In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant specifically denies this rote application of rules when he examines cases of conflict. In such cases, we do not say that both rules apply but we recognise that there are conflicting grounds and that judgement is required to see which applies. xxvi This is made more specific when he considers the casuistical questions where it becomes clear that the rules or principles supply guidelines rather than algorithms and require judgement for interpretation. Kant writes, "Is it murdering oneself to hurl oneself to certain death (like Curtius) in order to save one's country? Or is deliberate martyrdom, sacrificing oneself for the good of all mankind, also to be considered an act of heroism?" xxvii
Virtue Ethics or Kantian Ethics
If then we accept that both Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics are more wide ranging than Consequentialism and that both start from a position where the central activity is some sort of development of the agent, which is to be preferred as an approach to ethical questions? If the central activity is taken to be some sort of concern by the agent for her character or good will, are there compelling grounds for adopting a virtue ethics approach as opposed to a Kantian approach?
I shall argue that there is at least one ground for preferring Kantian Ethics which becomes evident when considering a common criticism that can be made to both
Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics as I have characterised them. The criticism is that so
characterised they are open to the self-centredness objection. If we are to keep our own character development or the development of a good will at the centre of ethical concern, isn't this unjustifiably self-centred. Shouldn't concern for others figure in a moral theory? To understand this point it is necessary to explain precisely how to understand this asymmetry between my attitude to my own character and my attitude to the character of others. In both Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics there is a different attitude to self development than to that same development in others. Virtue Ethics, has as its essence the development of the individual's own character and there is no essential mention of others in this development. Others figure just as the recipients of the other-regarding virtues that I acquire . In contrast, on a Kantian account although the duty of perfection is limited to the self, there is also essentially the recognition that other human beings are also seeking their own perfection. The recognition of this generates certain duties that I owe to others. These are duties that incorporate my recognition that they are also agents who are setting their own ends and seeking to develop their own good will. Negative duties not to obstruct them in this task and also positive duties of assistance are thus generated in virtue of this recognition of them as agents with ends. This is not an optional extra on the Kantian account since the development of the agent's own good will has to be considered alongside the constraints implicit in the recognition that others are also developing their own good will.
The key then to understanding this asymmetry and recognising that it does not imply the In contrast, in the Kantian account although there is an asymmetry in the sense that I do not have the same attitude to the development of good will of others as I do to the development of my own, there is built in the recognition that others are also embarked on this task and this generates obligations within me. The self -centredness objection which can apply to Virtue Ethics cannot apply to Kantian Ethics.
My argument is that the recognition that others are also developing a good will is necessary to Kantian Ethics but the recognition that others are also developing a virtuous character is, at best, only contingently present in Virtue Ethics. There is nothing necessary in my development of a virtuous character that requires that I take into account that others are also embarked on this task. In contrast, within Kantian
Ethics the development of a good will cannot be explained in isolation from the fact that others are also developing a good will. Now, even if the above is accepted it might be argued that there are other points that could be put forward to support a Virtue Ethics approach as opposed to a Kantian approach. One that was hinted at during the course of the paper was the incorporation within Kantian Ethics of principles or rules which might be deemed objectionable by supporters of certain forms of Virtue Ethics. I have not time to debate the merits of the debate between Virtue Ethics and Kantian Ethics on other fronts. However, I think that a case can be made for the central importance of the point that I have discussed.
In an ethical theory, concern for others must go beyond just viewing them as recipients of our other-regarding virtues. Their development must be considered hand in hand with our own. Therefore, if the characterisation that I have given of the central activity of Virtue Ethics is accepted, this criticism of the approach strikes at the very essence of the theory.
Conclusion
The opposition between Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism as described in much contemporary literature has been shown to be misplaced. Virtue
Ethics has been taken to be in opposition to Kantian Ethics and Consequentialism because of its concentration on character development rather than the Kantian or 
